Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part VI

Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd:  Part VI

Elizabeth’s ability to have children would surface in all marriage negotiations no less those for her alliance to the Hapsburgs.  As early as December 14, 1558, de Feria’s diplomatic assessments to King Philip, the potential bridegroom, were determining that Elizabeth would be “more likely to have children on account of her age and temperament”, than Mary (Hume Simancas: December 1558 4).  Surprisingly, in a short amount of time—April 1559—the evaluation had changed. Now with Philip’s proposal rejected and an Archduke put forward as candidate, de Feria informed his king that

“If my spies do not lie, which I believe they do not, for a certain reason which they have recently given me I understand she will not bear children” (Hume Simancas April 1559 29).  Bishop Quadra continued this premise in January 1561 in a letter to Philip, where he disrespectfully referred to the Queen as ‘this woman’. He stated that he “must not omit to say also that the common opinion, confirmed by certain physicians, is that this woman is unhealthy, and it is believed certain that she will not have children, although there is no lack of people who say she has already had some, but of this I have seen no trace and do not believe it” (Hume Simancas January 1561 122).

A Hapsburg Archduke Should Do the Trick

Philip’s next move was to get Elizabeth to marry a Hapsburg archduke.  Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, Count de Feria, was recalled to Spain upon his request but for several months in the spring and early summer of 1559 attended Court with his replacement.  For this particular assignment, Philip sent his newly-appointed ambassador, Alvarez de Quadra, Bishop of Aquila, to discuss the situation with the Queen.  As with de Feria, Philip received a detailed report of all that transpired. 

When approached by the Bishop, the Queen began to “talk about not wishing to marry and wanted to reply in that sense” to which de Quadra “cut short the colloquy” to assure Elizabeth he did not want an answer.  Talks continued with Cecil concerning the various marriageable candidates from Austria.  Cecil implied that had it not “been for the impediment of affinity the Queen would have married your Majesty [Philip], but the matter involved religious questions….” The Bishop had no qualms to stop this course of discussion either as “it would be fruitless now to discuss as the offer had fallen through” (Hume Simancas May 1559 35).  The Ambassador interpreted the message as being the Queen’s way to secretly show interest in marrying, despite protestations that she would remain unwed.

young willliam cecil
William Cecil

He returned to the discussion with Elizabeth to encourage her to see that “in a matter of this gravity touching the welfare and tranquillity of their kingdoms and those of their neighbours kings and queens could not always follow their own desires to the prejudice of those of their subjects without doing great wrong and grievous sin, and therefore she should not consult her own inclination about her marriage but should look at the ruin that would come to her country by her doing so” (Hume Simancas May 1559 35).   He said he wanted “to clear the ground and find out whether all this means a desire not to marry at all or simply to avoid a Catholic husband…”  Holding on to his patience, de Quadra listened as the Queen “went back again to her nonsense and said she would rather be a nun than marry…. We continued at this for some time wasting words and at last she said she was resolved not to marry except to a man of worth whom she had seen and spoken to”  (Hume Simancas May 1559 35).

When Elizabeth had learned Philip had signed a marriage treaty with Elisabeth of Valois, daughter of Henri II of France, she pretended to be annoyed.  After teasing Philip for being fickle and not being enough in love with her to wait longer for a conclusive answer to his proposal, Elizabeth herself was willing to listen to the Austrian proposal within a few short weeks.  The German and Spanish Ambassadors presented the idea formally to the Council.  Bishop Aquila reiterated an alliance between the Hapsburgs would please Philip not only “on account of the Queen’s own happiness and the welfare of her subjects, but also in the interest of the lasting alliance and union” (Hume Simancas May 1559 35).  Perhaps more to assure himself, de Quadra stated that “ so clearly is the need for her to marry being daily more understood by herself and her advisers, notwithstanding her disinclination to say yes, I need not despair of her listening to the proposal” or her councilors being receptive to it (Hume Simancas May 1559 35).  Despite this bravado, de Quadra could not definitively state her intentions.  He confessed to his King, “I am not sure about her for I do not understand her” (Hume Simancas May 1559 35).  She had him just where she wanted him.

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Elisabeth of Valois

Count de Feria, in one of his final letters to Philip, defended the queen in the negotiations concerning the Hapsburg match by saying he believed she approached the offer openly.  Yet, his confidence was not solid when he confessed, “although to say the truth I could not tell your Majesty what this woman means to do with herself, and those who know her best know no more than I do” (Hume Simancas April 1559 27).

Outcome

Formal introductions of Alvarez de Quadra, Bishop of Aquila as future Spanish Ambassador to England were part of the 12 April dispatches to de Feria from Philip II.  Included was the news that although Philip did not marry the English Queen, the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand I (Philip’s uncle) was interested in putting forth one of his sons as candidate.  Philip agreed to “promote and favour” either nephew. Believing that it would be “very good for all parties” (Hume Simancas April 1559 25).  Count de Feria was to get an audience as soon as possible with the Queen to let her know that Philip agreed to the idea of her marrying a Hapsburg Archduke.  The Ambassador was to “tell her that as the love I bear her is that of a good brother, I am always thinking of what will conduce to her welfare and the stability of her kingdom…”  (Hume Simancas April 1559 25).  Still not letting go of the possibility of the English making a complete conversion to Catholicism, Philip was adamant for his Ambassadors to ensure she accept the proposal and gave multiple reasons for the “good feeling which have prompted me to propose it” (Hume Simancas April 1559 25).

Philip was persistent in expecting the English to continue to see him with gratitude and as rescuer.  He instructed de Feria on April 24th to deliver a letter to Elizabeth telling him that its purpose was so that “they may understand thoroughly that they are ruined unless I succor and defend them…when you have frightened the Queen about this …you will assure her from me that I will never fail to help her in all I can to preserve her realm and settle her own affairs exactly the same as if they were my own” (Pryor 31). 

Philip’s message was clear in the letter written to Elizabeth.   As seen in the translation from the Spanish of line 11, he wrote, “…this business affects nothing less than the safety of your kingdom, and you may be assured that in this as in any other matter which affects you I shall be as attentive as I have been in the past…” (Pryor 31).

Feria letter

Letter to Elizabeth from Philip II in Spanish from 24 April 1559.

Elizabeth acquired the letter on the 28th and very soon after de Feria sent off a dispatch to his king assuring him that he “tried to frighten her” and that she had “answered amiably” and “she thanked your Majesty for your message.”  Then the Count was told by the Queen that England would pass Protestant settlement legislation.  A dispirited de Feria grumbled, “It is very troublesome to negotiate with this woman, as she is naturally changeable, and those who surround her are so blind and bestial that they do not at all understand the state of affairs” (Pryor 31).

For references, please refer to the blog entry “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part I.”

Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part V

Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd:  Part V

Already in December of 1558 Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, Count de Feria was plotting how to approach Elizabeth on marrying King Philip.  He knew that she was convinced that a foreigner was too divisive for the realm.  Added to this he had to persuade her not to marry an Englishman by pointing out that she would not want to “hold herself less than her sister, who would never marry a subject” (Hume Simancas: December 1558 4). His strategy included telling her it would look bad for her to marry a subject where there are so many worthy princes.  “After that we can take those whom she might marry here and pick them to pieces one by one, which will not require much rhetoric, for there is not a man amongst them worth anything” (Hume Simancas: December 1558 4).  The Count would stress the need for an alliance with Spain against the French threat and add the argument of maintaining the Catholic faith to secure her throne.  Okay, he had the strategy, now to implement it.

Philip’s Decision to Propose Marriage

Philip’s instructions to his ever-faithful ambassador, de Feria, on 10 January 1559 were to propose marriage to Elizabeth Regina when de Feria could obtain a private audience with Elizabeth.  The ever-cautious king did stipulate that Count Feria was not to propose any conditions until he ascertained “how the Queen is disposed towards the matter itself” (Hume Simancas January 1559 8).  Philip did struggle with his conscience and “many great difficulties” but he “decided to place on one side all other considerations which might be urged against it” and was “resolved to render this service to God, and offer to marry the queen of England”  (Hume Simancas January 1559 8).  He wrote to his Ambassador in England that he believed as a faithful Catholic he had “to sacrifice my private inclination” and if “it was not to serve God, believe me, I would not have got into this… Nothing would make me do this except the clear knowledge that it would gain the kingdom [of England] for his service and faith” (Somerset 107).

The difficulties Philip envisioned with the marriage included his obligation to be in his other dominions and therefore could not be in England; Elizabeth’s lack of sincere commitment to the Catholic faith; the French perceived threat to their interests; and, Spain’s exhausted treasury.  Despite these and “many other difficulties no less grave,” Philip admits that he “cannot lose sight of the enormous importance of such a match to Christianity and the preservation of religion” (Hume Simancas January 1559 8).   Philip did not think he could, in all conscience, risk the loss of England, and put neighboring countries in danger, to the Protestant faith.  

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Philip II by Anthonis Mor Van Dashorst, 1549-1555

Philip figured that as Elizabeth would have to be Catholic to marry him, it would “be evident and manifest” that he was “serving the Lord in marrying her and that she has been converted by his act” (Hume Simancas January 1559 8).   Not so astonishingly, Philip wanted to portray himself with having the upper hand, being seen as the benefactor of as many things as possible and to once again force a sense of obligation on Elizabeth.

Count de Feria, so loyal to his country and king, could not contemplate that Elizabeth would not readily marry Philip.  Imagine his surprise when she thanked him for the compliments but requested time to think it over—which she did for several months. 

Perhaps de Feria would have done well to have remembered Elizabeth’s comments in November 1558 when she referred to the loss of the peoples’ affections that her sister Mary experienced upon marriage to a foreigner.  This topic was discussed more thoroughly in the blog entry, “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part IV” at http://www.elizregina.com.

Elizabeth told de Feria that she would lay the question before her Privy Council and Parliament.  The Ambassador certainly had an ear to the ground.  He heard the rumblings that Elizabeth’s First Parliament was going to push forward the issue of her marriage (this topic has been discussed in the blog entry “Heir Unapparent” at https://elizregina.com/2013/04/02/heir-unapparent/).  He advised his king on 31 January 1559 “to wait for Parliament to press the Queen to marry” which she did not want to have happen.  If she did declare her choice while Parliament was sitting, “if the person chosen is not to their liking they could use the national voice to stop the affair” (Hume Simancas January 1559 13).

Elizabeth assured Count de Feria that if she were to marry anyone it would be Philip. Of course, the councilors were against it, just as she probably suspected they would be.  Elizabeth understood the diplomatic responses she had to make.  She was holding out on giving a true answer as she waited for the international scene to unfold and she did not think it was politic to turn Philip down outright, as she needed Spain and his good will.

One objection Elizabeth raised to the marriage was the consanguinity of her relationship with Philip. As the widow of her sister, she walked the fine line as her father had married his brother’s widow.  Henry VIII divorced Catherine of Aragon based on the violation of the Book of Leviticus.  A dispensation from the Pope would tactically admit her illegitimacy by saying that she and Philip could marry; there could be no way to apply the objection of consanguinity to Henry and Catherine’s marriage because if they were legally married, Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn would have been bigamous.

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Elizabeth Regina, Coronation Portrait

By the time of his letter to his King on February 12th, de Feria was clued to Elizabeth’s responses and her delays.  He reported that at his audience with her the day before she “began to answer me by keeping to her old argument for not wishing to marry” but when he “cut short the reply” and pressed for an answer his exasperation could be felt.  “I soon understood what the answer would be, namely, that she did not think of marrying, and so to shelve the business with fair words” (Hume Simancas February 1559 14). So ended this conversation, yet, the Count’s optimism could not be curtailed.  He believed that even though he “would have no answer that was not a very good one” he “left the matter open” (Hume Simancas February 1559 14).

By February 12, Paulo Tiepolo, Venetian Ambassador to King Philip’s Court was conceding that “the discussion about the Queen’s marriage to this King has in great measure ceased, and it seems that the whole of this negotiation will depend on the resolve of Parliament about religion” (Brown Venice February 1559 21).

Some flippancy could not be held back from a London writer in correspondence with Paulo Tiepolo. Tiepolo related that the Londoner revealed that “Parliament also sent a deputation to pray the Queen that she will be pleased to marry within the Realm” and although no particular candidate was mentioned “her Majesty, after having first made some verbal resistance to the first point, as becoming a maiden, replied that to oblige them she would marry; adding with regard to the second point, that she had well seen how many inconveniences her sister was subjected to, from having married a foreigner. Obviously, knowing Elizabeth fairly well, the correspondent continued “some persons are of the opinion that she will marry to please herself (as it seems to me that I also should do the like), and perhaps a person of not much lineage. Amongst those most frequently mentioned is a gentleman who is now in Flanders, and who is said to be ill there. Guess who he is!” (Brown Venice February 1559 19).  Robert Dudley never was out of peoples’ thoughts as Elizabeth’s possible consort.

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Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester 

One thing that discomposed the Ambassador was the suspicion he had over the integrity of his correspondence with Spain.  He wrote to his fellow ministers in a debriefing at the end of February 1559 that sometimes it seemed as if Elizabeth could read his thoughts.  He speculated that Elizabeth was “so well informed about this that it looks as if she had seen His Majesty’s letters.  This should be taken good note of” (Hume Simancas February 1559 17).

The Rejection

On 19 March, de Feria shared with Philip that during his audience with Elizabeth she told him “she could not marry your Majesty as she was a heretic. I was much surprised to hear her use such words and begged her to tell me the cause of so great a change since I last discussed the subject with her, but she did not enlighten me” (Hume Simancas March 1559 18).

By this time the international situation had shifted as she was in sounder diplomatic standing with France and she could not keep up the pretext that she would be a Catholic.  She and Parliament were pressing forward with religious changes as de Feria wrote to Philip on March 18th that she was “resolved about what was yesterday passed in Parliament, and which Cecil and Chamberlain Knollys and their followers have managed to bring about for their own ends” (Hume Simancas March 1559 18).

Feria was quite astounded by her response which he could only contribute to those heretics who “leave no stone unturned to compass their ends that no doubt they have persuaded her that your Majesty wishes to marry her for religious objects alone, and so she kept repeating to me that she was heretical and consequently could not marry your Majesty” (Hume Simancas March 1559 18).  Fearful of losing the objective Feria told his King that he assured her that he “did not consider she was heretical and could not believe that she would sanction the things which were being discussed in Parliament, because if she changed the religion she would be ruined” (Hume Simancas March 1559 18).

Now we see the blend of religious policy, marriage policy and foreign policy. In Spanish eyes to balance all three was virtually impossible. Those Spanish eyes were not viewing Elizabeth Regina in all her determined glory.  Elizabeth was determined to return her country to the Church of Henry VIII if not Edward VI; she was determined not to marry; and she was equally determined to pacify French and Spanish demands.  Paulo Tiepolo wrote from Brussels on 19 March 1559 to the Doge that the Bishop of Aquila told him that Elizabeth risked “alienating herself entirely from the Catholic religion” but he also “bestowed on her as much praise for talent and ability as was ever given to any other woman” (Brown Venice March 1559 44).  High praise indeed.

Lorenzo_Priuli_Cropped
Lorenzo Priuli, Doge of Venice

Philip wrote to his Ambassador, Count de Feria, on 23 March after the negotiations for marriage to Elizabeth had failed expressing lukewarm regret.  “By your letters and by the bishop of Aquila I am informed of the Queen’s decision about the marriage, and, although I cannot help being sorry that the affair has not been arranged, as I greatly desired and the public weal demanded, yet as the Queen thinks it was not necessary and that with good friendship we shall attain the same object, I am content that it should be so” (Hume Simancas March 1559 19).

Elizabeth was to rely on Philip’s “friendship implicitly so that no opportunity shall be presented for the French to be appealed to in case of necessity.…”  The Hapsburg interests emerged in the direct mission for de Feria: “The main end and aim that you must have in view in all things is to obstruct and impede, by every way, form and means, any rupture between the Catholics and heretics in England, this being the best course for the pacification of the country, and for the welfare of our interests, as it will deprive the French of any excuse for putting their foot in the country, which is the thing principally to be avoided” (Hume Simancas March 1559 20).  Quite an assignment.

As always Philip needed to cover all his bases.  Worried that “the Queen might perhaps think I was offended at her rejection of the marriage,” he wrote a separate letter to de Feria that was to be presented to Elizabeth. For a man who approached the proposal feeling “like a condemned man awaiting his fate” (Somerset 107), he wanted to maintain the idea of friendship between them.  The letter Feria was commissioned to give to Elizabeth stressed to her that Philip was “quite satisfied with what pleases her.”  Feria was given a bit of leeway by his boss to give the necessary “complimentary words and offers of service…in accord with the contents of the letter” and Spanish interests (Hume Simancas March 1559 20).

It is good to see Philip acknowledge the diligence of his hard-working Ambassador by including in the letter praise for “the prudence, moderation and zeal” Count de Feria had shown in all his dealings with the Queen.  The King thanked his servant but could not help but send a not-so-subtle message that he expected Feria “to continue the same care, diligence and good will in the guidance of affairs touching my interests” (Hume Simancas March 1559 20).

The King wanted his ambassador to ensure the Queen understood that he would always be ready to assist her and cooperate with her government.  Philip did want to assure her that he would “preserve the good friendship and brotherhood that I have hitherto maintained.” Elizabeth was also to be advised that Philip would “render her any service in the matter of her marriage …with all the goodwill …ever shown in matters that concern her” (Hume Simancas March 1559 19).

Elizabeth took the chance to tease de Feria on his master’s inconstancy saying that if Philip would not change religions for “all the kingdoms of the earth” then “much less would he do it for a woman.”  Feria’s romantically diplomatic answer was that “men did more for a woman than for anything else” (Hume Simancas March 1559 18).  According to his report, Elizabeth shifted the line of the interview by discussing the large sums of money taken out of the country every year for the Pope and that she knew it must be ended.

Interestingly, Feria revealed a maneuver on the part of Sir Francis Knollys.  He said that about a half hour after they were talking, Knollys came to announce supper was ready.  Feria clearly thought this was “arranged by those who are working this wickedness, for there is nothing that annoys them more than that I should speak to her.”  He took his leave and informed Philip that he told her “that she was not the Queen Elizabeth that I knew and that I was very dissatisfied with what I had heard, and if she did what she said she would be ruined” (Hume Simancas March 1559 18).  Pretty courageous fellow.

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 Sir Francis Knollys

For references, please refer to the blog entry “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part I.”

Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part III

Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part III

Philip protected Elizabeth after the Wyatt and Dudley rebellions.  She was indebted to him for her improved treatment by her sister, Queen Mary, and the Court.  Philip “wisely determined that Elizabeth’s petty misdemeanours should be winked at” (Strickland 111).  Why should activity, bordering on treason, be ignored?  Elizabeth was the main heir with Mary, Queen of Scots and Dauphiness of France was second.  Hapsburg interests had to prevent the balance of power in Europe from moving to the French.  If Mary Stuart became Queen of England, France and Scotland, Spain would lose its hold on world affairs.  Therefore, “this sudden kindness of Philip, who thought Elizabeth a much less obnoxious character than his father Charles the Fifth had conceived her to have been, did not arise from any regular principle of real generosity, but partly from an affection of popularity, and partly from a refined sentiment of policy” (Nichols 11).

Philip Understood Elizabeth Was the Best Heiress Presumptive

There were issues with Elizabeth as heir: first, her sister did not relish the thought of appointing a successor.  Even when Philip sent his confessor “Fresneda to England to urge Mary to send a message to Elizabeth recognizing her as heir to the throne,” Mary refused (Ridley 72).  The antagonism Mary felt toward Elizabeth was a difficulty that Philip knew he had to overcome.  He did persuade Mary to make an effort at reconciliation and enfold Elizabeth into the Court.  One-time Ambassador from Spain, Simon Renard, succinctly stated a second issue in June of 1555 he wrote a memorandum to Charles V outlining his concerns. “I foresee trouble on so great a scale that the pen can hardly set it down. Certain it is that the order of succession has been so badly decided that the Lady Elizabeth comes next, and that means heresy again, and the true religion overthrown. Churchmen will be wronged, Catholics persecuted; there will be more acts of vengeance than heretofore…. A calamitous tragedy will lie ahead” (Tyler XIII June 1555 216).

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Charles V

Spanish diplomats foresaw that if Elizabeth were to succeed, there would be religious revolution once again.  But, what if she were married to a Catholic?  Philip realized she was the only plausible successor to his wife and that Elizabeth would be queen because the people would not have it any other way.  If he could use Elizabeth to promote Hapsburg interests and encourage her to be beholden to those interests, things would turn in his favor.   Elizabeth could be a “demure, flatteringly deferential young lady” (Plowden 68).  Philip saw no reason why with the right husband, suggested by her concerned and kindly brother-in-law, this ‘calamitous tragedy’ could be avoided. 

The Savoy Marriage

What criteria would entail the right husband?  He must be a Catholic, a Hapsburg ally or dependent with enough status to garner a marriage to a Queen Regnant.

In a memorandum prepared for Philip by Simon Renard, he let it be known that Elizabeth should marry the Duke of Savoy.  This would have placed a lieutenant in England to help Queen Mary when Philip would be absent and help promote international relations (Plowden 65). 

Simon_Renard
Simon Renard 

That early proposal between Elizabeth and Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, was suggested but came to nothing.  Philip did not give up easily.  According to several written sources upon meeting Elizabeth at Court, Philip “paid her such obeisance as to fall with one knee to the ground, notwithstanding his usual state and solemnity” (Nichols 11). He did not account for her resolve. “Elizabeth failed not to avail herself of every opportunity of paying her court to her royal brother-in-law, with whom she was on very friendly terms, although she would not comply with his earnest wish of her becoming the wife of his friend and ally, Philibert of Savoy” (Strickland 110). 

Late in 1556, Philip again pursued this alliance.  This time he put extreme pressure on Mary to ensure it took place. Letters between Mary and Philip show the tension this caused as he felt Mary should force Elizabeth to wed.  She was reluctant to do that and used it as a way to get her husband back to England’s shores as then they could pray together to God—this was too weighty a matter to be determined without Him and him.  Mary probably did not want Elizabeth to marry and produce an heir, strengthening her position for the throne; she also was reluctant to approve of it without the consent of Parliament.  Philip implied if Parliament did not agree he would blame her.  Mary wrote to him: “But since your highness writes in those letters, that if Parliament set itself against this thing, you will lay the blame upon me, I beseech you in all humility to put off the business till your return, and then you shall judge if I am blameworthy or no.  For otherwise your highness will be angry against me, and that will be worse than death for me, for already I have begun to taste your anger all too often, to my great sorrow” (Porter 399). 

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Philip and Mary

Despite Mary’s protests of being held to blame, she did take steps to achieve Philip’s request.  Elizabeth was sent for to join the Christmas Court.  She arrived in London on 28 November and returned to Hatfield by 3 December.  It was assumed the Queen brought up the subject of the marriage to Philibert and Elizabeth rejected the proposal.  This topic has been more fully discussed in the blog entry, ‘Fate is Remarkable’, at https://elizregina.com/2013/03/12/fate-is-remarkable/

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Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy

Elizabeth was allowed to return to Court before the end of February 1557.  Philip returned to England in the spring of 1557 to gain support for his war with France and “to settle his scheme for the marriage of Elizabeth and Emmanuel Philibert” (Queen Elizabeth I 235).  While he was successful in obtaining a commitment for the war, he was not successful regarding Elizabeth.  Mary and Elizabeth both were stubbornly opposed to it.  If Elizabeth were to marry Emmanuel Philibert, Philip would acquire a Catholic client state out of England. To him it would be a win-win situation.  To Mary it was not.  She could not sanction the alliance as it would be as good as handing Elizabeth the succession.  Mary felt that Elizabeth should not be the Tudor heir because she was an illegitimate heretic. “Mary seems to have convinced herself that Elizabeth’s whole claim to royalty was fraudulent” (Loades Mary Tudor 169).

While the Queen had her reasons for not sanctioning her sister’s marriage, Elizabeth  would not approve of the marriage either.  She perceived that the succession had to clearly be acquired on her own, not as if it had been orchestrated by Philip

Marriage Proposal to the Crown Prince of Sweden
Elizabeth was acting with great circumspection so as not to jeopardize her position nor antagonize her sister.  Therefore, when the King of Sweden, in the spring of 1558, sent an envoy to her to propose marriage between her and his son, she hastily informed him that any such request must first be submitted to the Queen and her Council.

Gustav-I-Sweden      Eric K of SW
King Gustav I Vasa of Sweden              Eric, Crown Prince soon Eric XIV

Sir Thomas Pope informed Mary what had taken place.  According to him, when Elizabeth let the Ambassador know in no uncertain terms that she would not treat with him, the Ambassador assured her that the king was “as a man of honor and a gentleman” who “thought it most proper to make the first application to herself” and that “having by this preparatory step obtained her consent, he would next mention the affair in form to her majesty” (Wart 96) .    Evidently, Elizabeth informed the Swede that she “could not listen to any proposals of that nature, unless made by the queen’s advice or authority” and “that if left to her own will, we would always prefer a single condition of life” (Wart 97). 

Mary was very pleased when she heard how Elizabeth had handled the situation.  She called Sir Thomas Pope to Court to hear of the meeting first hand.  She then commissioned Sir Thomas “to write to the princess and acquaint her with how much she was satisfied with this prudent and dutiful answer to the king of Sweden’s proposition.”  He was then returned to Hatfield to stress to Elizabeth how much her conduct was appreciated by the Queen and also to find out what Elizabeth’s views were concerning matrimony in general. Pope was to “receive from her own mouth the result of her sentiments concerning it;  and at the same time to take an opportunity of founding her affections concerning the duke of Savoy, without mentioning his name” (Wart 98).  The Hapsburgs were still anxious to form another alliance between the English and Spanish crowns.  Sir Thomas knew the importance of this to the Queen and did his best to carry out his mission and inform her of the results.  On April 26, 1558, he informed the Queen of his conversation with Elizabeth when she responded to his questions concerning the Swedish and Savoy proposals and matrimony.  

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Sir Thomas Pope

“Whereunto after a little  pause taken, her grace answered in forme following, ‘Master Pope i requyre you, after my most humble commendaticions to the quenes majestie, to render unto the same lyke tahnkes, that it pleased her highnes of her goodnes, to conceive so well of my answer made to the same messenger; and herwithal, of her princelie consideration, with such speede to command you by your letters to signyfie the same unto me: who before remained wonderfullie perplexed, fering that her majestie might mistake the same: for which her goodnes I ackowledge myself bound to honour, serve, love, and obey her highnes, during my life.  Requyring you also to saye unto her majestie, that in the king my brothers time, there was offered me a verie honorable marriage or two: and ambassadors sent to treat with me touching the same; whereupon I made my humble suit unto his highness, as some of honour yet living can be testimonies, that it would lyke the same to give me leave, with his graces favour, to remayne in that estate I was, which of all others best liked me or pleased me’”  (Wart 99-100).

Elizabeth finished off her argument by stressing to Pope her sentiments.  “And, in good faith, I pray you say unto her Highness, I am even at this present of the same mind, and so intend to continue, with Her Majesty’s favour: and assuring her Highness I so well like this estate, as I persuade myself there is not any kind of life comparable unto it”  (Queen Elizabeth I 237).

Once the Princess’s response had been recorded, Pope informed Queen Mary what he then announced.  “And when her Grace had thus ended, I was so bold as of myself to say unto her Grace, her pardon first required that I thought few or none would believe but that her Grace could be right well contented to marry; so that there were some honourable marriage offered her by the Queen’s Highness, or by Her Majesty’s assent. Whereunto her Grace answered, ‘What I shall do hereafter I know not; but I assure you, upon my truth and fidelity, and as God be merciful unto me, I am not at this time otherwise minded than I have declared unto you; no, though I were offered the greatest prince in all Europe.’ And yet perchance the Queen’s Majesty may conceive this rather to proceed of a maidenly shamefacedness, than upon any such certain determination” (Queen Elizabeth I 237-238).  Here was a man who, as a product of his era and not understanding the true will of Elizabeth, could not fathom that she would not wish to marry.

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Elizabeth in her Coronation Robes, less than a year after her interview with Pope

To complete the inquiry and perhaps to put her stamp on the response which Elizabeth must have known was being sent to her sister, she wrote a letter to Mary.  The letter that follows comes to us from the historian Gregorio Leti’s sources. 

“Madame, my dear Sister, However deeply I may
have fallen into disgrace with your Majesty, I have
always felt that you were so just and good that I
have never imputed the cause to anything but my
own ill-fortune. And even if my troubles had been a
thousand times greater they would have been incapable
of removing from my heart the loyalty and respect
which I owe to your Majesty. The ties of blood by
which we are united make me devotedly attached to
your interests, and I am ever inspired by a perfect
submission to the Royal and Sovereign authority of
your Majesty. The answer which I gave to the
Swedish ambassador is an evidence of my obedience;
I could not have replied in any other manner without
failing in my duty to you. But the thanks, which
you have been pleased to send me by Mr. Pope, is
only a part of your generous kindness, which has
filled me with affection and gratitude for you. I can
assure you, Madame, that since I have been old
enough to reason, I have had no other thought in my
heart for you except the love which one owes to a
sister, and, even more, the profound respect which
is due to a mistress and a queen. My feelings
will never change, and I should welcome, with
much pleasure, opportunities of showing you that I
am your Majesty’s very obedient servant and sister,
ELIZABETH” (Queen Elizabeth I 239).

Phantom Pregnancy of 1558—Its Foundation from 1556

“Philip was forced to acknowledge defeat” (Queen Elizabeth I 235).  Elizabeth had evaded his attempts to influence her to wed.  She remained in the background under the watchful eye of Sir Thomas Pope at Hatfield while the queen harbored hopes of another pregnancy.  Philip’s brief visit to England in the spring of 1557 to untangle the Savoy and surprise Swedish marriage proposals and ask for military assistance was enough to raise the hopes of Mary that she was expecting a child.  Responses by the principal parties, the Court and even the international diplomatic world to Mary’s declared pregnancy of 1557 were cemented in the events of 1556.

Back in 1556 Simon Renard kept Charles V informed of the minute details of Mary’s pregnancy telling the emperor “that one cannot doubt that she is with child. A certain sign of this is the state of the breasts, and that the child moves. Then there is the increase of the girth, the hardening of the breasts and the fact that they distill” (Tyler XIII June 1555 217).

Shortly thereafter Renard had to let the expectant grandfather know the reason he had not written to him with the good news.  Apparently the Queen’s “doctors and ladies have proved to be out in their calculations by about two months, and it now appears that she will not be delivered before eight or ten days from now” (Tyler XIII June 1555 216).

Of one thing Renard was certain, “everything in this kingdom depends on the Queen’s safe deliverance.” He was incredulous “how the delay in the Queen’s deliverance encourages the heretics to slander and put about false rumours; some say that she is not with child at all…. Those whom we have trusted inspire me with the most misgivings as to their loyalty. Nothing appears to be certain, and I am more disturbed by what I see going on than ever before” (Tyler XIII June 1555 216).  The Ambassador was concerned for Hapsburg and Catholic interests as members of the Privy Council were showing “an increasing amount of boldness and evil intentions” indicating a possible warming to the French (Tyler XIII June 1555 216).

These passages, except for the change of name and dates, could have been written in 1558.   Philip had left England to lead his troop in the war against France but dutifully sent Count de Feria to Mary “to congratulate her on the announcement that she had sent him of her new hopes of an heir to the throne hopes which he probably knew to be illusory, though he so far humoured her as to say that her letter contained the best news that he had heard since the loss of Calais” (Queen Elizabeth I 239.

Upon their marriage Mary was 37 years old, eleven years older than Philip.  She did not wear those years well.  Years of stress, worry and ill-health had taken their toll on her. Now, several years into their marriage with one delusionary pregnancy behind her, chances were this would be too.  Philip recognized her to be mortally ill since he had been out of the country for over a year and would have noticed the marked difference in her health that those close to home may have not detected.  When he was back in Brussels he wrote to his sister and speculated what he “must do in England, in the event either of the Queen’s survival or of her death, for these are questions of the greatest importance, on which the welfare of my realms depend” (Tyler November 1558 502).

bloody mary
Queen Mary I

In the summer the Queen was clearly becoming weaker and weaker.  “It was clear that there was no pregnancy” (Whitelock 327).  By the end of October it “became apparent to everyone, Mary included, that she was not going to survive” (Porter 403).

Queen Mary died November 17, 1558.  Foxe’s narrated from information he received from Rees Mansell, a gentleman of Mary’s privy chamber, that Queen Mary at “about three or four o’clock in the morning, yielded life to nature, and her kingdom to Queen Elizabeth her sister.  As touching the manner of whose death, some say that she died of a tympany, some (by her much sighing before her death) supposed she died of thought and sorrow.  Whereupon her council, seeing her sighing, and desirous to know the cause, to the end they might minister the more ready consolation unto her, feared, as they said, that she took that thought for the king’s Majesty her husband, which was gone from her.  To whom she answering again, ‘Indeed,’ said she, ‘that may be one cause, but that is not the greatest wound that pierceth my oppressed mind:’ but what that was, she would not express to them.  Albeit, afterward, she opened the matter more plainly to Master Rise and Mistress Clarencius (if it be true that they told me, which heard it of Master Rise himself); who then, being most familiar with her, and most bold about her, told her, that they feared she took thought for King Philip’s departing from her. ‘Not that only,’ said she, ‘but when I am dead and opened, you shall find Calais lying in my heart.’  And here an end of Queen Mary” (Foxe 330).

John_Foxe
John Foxe

While Philip, the historic records shows, was courteous and gentlemanly toward her, affection did not seem to run too deep.  In the midst of a business letter to his sister, Joanna of Austria, Princess Dowager of Portugal, Regent of Spain, Philip announced the death of his wife, Queen Mary concluding, “I felt a reasonable regret for her death” (Tyler November 1558 502).  Maybe he was ‘made out of iron and stone.’

For references, please refer to the blog entry “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Part I.”

Tight Purse Strings

Tight Purse Strings

Henry VII was well-known for his miserliness. “The popular tradition respecting his avarice, which has descended to us, seems only too well founded. It is quite the characteristic of a usurer to have a fondness for gold. We are informed that whenever a gold coin entered the chest of Henry it never found its way out again” ( Bergenroth 69).

Don Pedro de Ayala, envoy to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, revealed that although Henry had many qualities that would have rendered him great, “he had but one characteristic which spoilt all the rest, his love of money” (Bergenroth 53).

It was claimed that when he was not with his council or in public he was “writing accounts of his expenses with his own hand” (Tremlett 95). “He also handled the cash himself. In his own handwriting, he itemised the moneys delivered in one day to … the treasurer of his chamber…all amounting to several thousands of pounds” (Hutchinson 41).

Ledger initialed by Henry VII from 1492       Accounts written in Henry’s handwriting

 ledger         account

The king collected money from taxation, plus the obligations and fines he placed on his subjects (rich and poor). Out of the “sixty-two families in the English peerage that survived the butchery of the War of the Roses, forty-seven were at the king’s mercy, either by living under attainder or forfeiting substantial sums to the crown to guarantee their good behavior” (Hutchinson 42). These recognisances were imposed and collected by the able administrators, Sir Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley. The activities of these two men were known throughout the Court as Don Pedro de Ayala reported to Ferdinand and Isabella that Henry’s servants had “a wonderful dexterity in getting hold of other people’s money” (Bergenroth 207).

Henry VII’s priorities were revealed in the power and prestige granted to these two trusted advisors. The policies they implemented, in the king’s name, generated as much hatred and distrust as they did revenue. Although not everyone felt that way, courtiers who profited from Henry VII’s fiscal policies did worry when Henry VIII came to the throne that he would reverse “his father’s tight-fistedness…” (Jones 222), most resented Henry VII and his administration. In fact, one of Henry VIII’s first acts as king was the arrest of these two men, “greate counsaylers to the late kyng, were attached and brought to the Tower, not to the litle rejoysyng of many persones, whiche by them wer greved, whiche, attachement was thought to bee procured by malice of theim, that with their aucthoritie, in the late kynges daies wer offended, or els to shifte the noyse, of the straight execucion of penall statutes in the late kynges daies, by punishement of those persones, and other promoters, for to satisfie and appeace the people” (Hall).

For a discussion of the land revenues and prerogative feudal rights which Henry VII took advantage of to generate income, see Stanley Bertram Chrimes’ Henry VII. It is enough here to understand that Henry VII found a source of revenue which he pursued “with a zeal and relentless application which earned him and his agents an unpopularity and a measure of odium which became marked towards the end of the reign…” (Chrimes 209). Although other sovereigns had used these methods, none had “taken such a close personal part in wielding the whips and scorpions of financial pressures to attain their ends” (Chrimes 214). No wonder Henry VII emerges in the pages of history as miserly and avaricious. A study of the Calendar of Close Rolls for 1500-1509 by K. B. McFarlane led him to declare that by the end of his reign Henry VII “governed by recognizance” (Chrimes 214). It has been estimated that Henry extorted (hard to use any other word) close to £495 million in present-day monetary values from his subjects (Hutchinson 43).

Henry “made rebellions, like wars, pay their own expenses, and even yield him a mine of treasure, which was a source, in its turn, of stability to the country, giving him more ample power to put down future outbreaks. For the great majority of insurgents he had no other punishment than fines…. Violation, even of laws which were antiquated, was visited with fines which went to the king’s coffers” (Gairdner 215).

Despite the general belief that Henry had amassed a large surplus early in his reign (Chrimes 217), the Spanish envoy, Don Pedro de Ayala, remarked, “The King of England is less rich than generally said. He likes to be thought very rich because such a belief is advantageous to him in many respects. The King himself said to me that it is his intention to keep his subjects low, because riches would only make them haughty…” (Hutchinson 41). The viewpoint that Henry’s miserliness was a political rather than an avaricious motive is taken up further by Polydore Vergil. Writing under the patronage of the Tudors, Vergil did not ignore the fact that Henry VII gained money in dubious ways although he does offer explanations.

…id quod argumentum non dubium erat eum, sicut ipse aiebat, studio coercendi ferocem populi inter factiones nutriti animum, non item cupiditate cogendae pecuniae, ea coepisse uti severitate, quemadmodum supra demonstravimus, quanquam saucii ista non tam severitatis quam avaritiae tela esse clamabant. Sane modestus princeps non emungebat suos fortunis immodice qui regnum rebus omnibus longe locupletissimum reddidit reliquitque, quod planum praeter caetera fecit immanis auri pariter atque argenti copia quae in annos singulos in insulam importata est a mercatoribus ultro citroque commeantibus, quos ille saepenumero pecunia ad tempus data gratuito iuvabat, ut mercatura ars una omnium cunctis aeque mortalibus cum commoda, tum necessaria, in suo regno copiosior esset.

This was a sure sign that, just as he himself said, he resorted to this severity for the sake of curbing the fierce spirits of a people brought up amidst factionalism, not out of a lust for money-making, as I have shown above, although those who were wounded in this way exclaimed these were the darts of greed, not severity. Indeed, this modest sovereign did not despoil his subjects of their fortunes immoderately, for he left behind him a kingdom most wealthy in all respects. This is made plain, among other things, by the immense amount of gold and silver annually brought into the island by merchants plying to and fro, whom he very frequently helped with interest-free loans, so that the flow of commerce, both useful and necessary for all men, would be more abundant in his realm.

Thomas Penn brings forth the idea that Henry VII’s obsession with money was not the actions “of a miser, but of a sophisticated financial mind…” (Penn 156). This is an interesting point of view and one that was not held by many others, although Josephine Ross does admire Henry and his policies. She commented that Henry “…was a born accountant, who loved to spend hours closeted with lists of figures signing every entry with his own hand, those accounts revealed some attractive aspects of his personality” (Ross 22). His financial records do show expenditures to charitable causes, music, a variety of entertainments, architecture, sporting events, and gambling (Ross, Penn, and Chrimes). According to Ross, “There was nothing miserly about Henry VII; he was intensely careful with money, but he recognized the importance of spending freely to keep up a regal image” (Ross 22). This incongruity between miserliness and extravagance is something which was held in common between Henry VII and his granddaughter, Elizabeth Regina.

Elizabeth had inherited “…the financial prudence of her grandfather” (Neale 294) and the depleted coffers of her father. “A sense of economy was inbred as well as inborn in Elizabeth” (Neale 296). Prior to her accession her income had been small even after she received her inheritance from her father and acquired Hatfield.  Elizabeth had learned to be careful with her monies. “Her financial affairs, which had been in a precarious state since her father’s death, assumed a more healthy aspect when she took over the book-keeping herself, maintaining meticulous records of her expenditure and personally signing each page of the accounts” (Somerset 28).

Even as Queen she was watchful and her “stringent economies effected soon after her accession…” plus her “prudent financial management” allowed her to escape true money worries while maintaining her Court (Somerset 281).  What she managed to achieve with the limited resources available is astounding.  It is “that financial sense of Elizabeth’s, her resolute, irritating parsimony that the secret of greatness lay” (Neale 101).

She was a penny-pincher, but she knew, like her grandfather, where and when to spend money for political reasons. “Balancing the books was to be her life-long preoccupation as Queen” and she understood there had to be revenue (Starkey 221).  Elizabeth realized that, as money got tighter, she had to extract money at any possible source beyond the ordinary income from taxes, rates, etc.

It is well-known that privateering brought in some revenue for the Crown but never as much as hoped. Elizabeth had exclaimed that “she had known from the very first that everyone would make a fortune out of the business except herself” (Strachey 112).

One revenue source came from the requirement that Bishops give 10% of their revenue to the Crown and at their appointment the equivalent of a year’s income.  Although it was claimed she did not exploit this, it was common knowledge that later in her reign, Elizabeth was able to tap into this income by moving her Bishops between dioceses (Somerset 86).  She believed, by using “this judicious redistribution of the national wealth she was preserving her kingdom’s stability” (Somerset 88).

When the economy started to slip, she responded by selling some property, appropriating new funds and further reducing government expenditure. Yet, like her grandfather, Elizabeth had virtuous reasons for her miserliness.  When England was at war late in her reign, she “practiced eternal vigilance over her own expenses, to the disgust of the greedy cormorants about her, everlastingly grumbling and gibing at her parsimony…” (Neale 346).

“Parsimony is not a popular virtue” (Neale 296).  Elizabeth instituted “stringent economies that were often unpopular, but these measures kept England solvent at a time when most European countries were virtually bankrupt” (Weir 225).  Keeping her debt to a minimum and balancing her expenditures with her ordinary income required her to never relax the tight purse strings. She performed wonders in keeping her creditors satisfied and shouldering most of the burden without “impairing the efficiency of government or casting the gloom of poverty over the Court, the splendor of which was the nation’s pride and the monarch’s dignity” (Neale 296).

To further complicate money issues was this paradox: Elizabeth was miserly for reasons of political capital and she was extravagant for the same purpose.  Although careful with her money, Elizabeth never stinted on outward show.  She knew that to attract the upper classes to her Court she had to impress the whole country with the visual aspects of power. Perception is reality. The queen wore costly gowns (she had over three thousand –a topic for a future blog) and owned a magnificent collection of jewelry knowing full-well the role she played. “Princes, you know, stand upon stages so that their actions are viewed and beheld of all men…” (Marcus, 189).

Therefore, clothing, court ceremonial, entertainments, even furnishings were extravagant with the intent to show majesty and impress all who came to the Court.
Many costs of these items could be defrayed by what would become a large, unavoidable expense for the noblemen–a lavish gift for the queen.  She enjoyed receiving costly gifts throughout her reign.  A contemporary explained that “She was very rich in jewels, which had been given her by her subjects; for in times of progress there was no person that entertained her in his house but (besides his extraordinary charge in feasting her and her train) he bestowed a jewel upon her; a custom in former times begun by some of her especial favorites that (having in great measure tasted of her bounty) did give her only of her own; though otherwise that kind of giving was not so pleasing to gentlemen of meaner quality” (Robinson 192).  The Spanish envoy Count de Feria commented soon after her coronation that Elizabeth “is very fond of having things given to her” (Erickson 174).

Ship Pendant given to Elizabeth                Gloves given to Elizabeth
by Sir Francis Drake                                     by the University of Oxford
  ship pendant 001                                     gloves1

Elizabeth’s yearly progresses were another way to subsidize the living costs of Court. Being housed at others’ expense during her lengthy progresses was a sure way for her to be seen by her people, in all her majesty, and allow her to graciously accept the hospitality of many and not cost the Exchequer any money (Ridley 180).

As the decades progressed and expenses mounted, Elizabeth was less apt to reward her courtiers as in earlier days as she was led to “tightening up in the distribution of patronage” (Somerset 547).  She reduced government expenditure, rewarding her administrators so sparingly with titles, lands and monopolies, especially monopolies, that corruption was inevitable as nobles tried to find ways to generate funds.

Corruption became rampant and she scolded Parliamentary members by exclaiming “…if these fellows were well answered and paid with lawful coin, there would be fewer counterfeits among them” (Perry Word of a Prince 199).  She was genuinely surprised when courtiers seemed less than satisfied with the patronage that was handed out. She had learned “that neither gifts nor pensions were the foundation of loyalty” (Neale 101).

Through it all, the welfare of her people and her duty to them, was foremost in her mind.  Addressing her people late in her reign, the Queen said that “though God hath raised me high, yet this I count the glory of my crown: that I have reigned with your loves” (Marcus 337).

Works Cited

Bergenroth, G. A., and, Pascual De. Gayangos. Calendar of Letters,
Dispatches and State Papers, Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere: Published by the Authority of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury under theDirection of the Master of the Rolls. Henry VII 1485 – 1509. ed. Vol. 1. London:

Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1862. Google Books. Web. 26 Nov.
2012.

Chrimes, S. B. Henry VII. Berkeley: University of California, 1972. Google Books. Web. 31 Dec. 2012.

Erickson, Carolly. The First Elizabeth. New York: Summit Books. 1983. Print.

Gairdner, James. Henry the Seventh,. London: Macmillan, 1889. Google Books. Web. 26 Nov. 2012.

Hall, Edward, and Charles Whibley. Henry VIII,. Vol. I. London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1904. Google Books. Web. 1 Dec. 2012.

Hutchinson, Robert. Young Henry: The Rise of Henry VIII. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011. Google Books. Web. 02 Dec. 2012.

Jones, Michael K. and Malcolm G. Underwood.  The King’s Mother: Lady Margaret
Beaufort, Countess of Richmond and Derby. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Print.

Marcus, Leah S. et al., eds. Elizabeth I: The Collected Works. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Print.

Neale, J. E. Queen Elizabeth I. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957. Print.

Penn, Thomas.  Winter King; the Dawn of Tudor England.  New York: Penguin Books, 2012. Print.

Perry, Maria.  The Word of a Prince: A Life of Elizabeth from Contemporary
Documents.  Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1990.  Print.

Ridley, Jasper. Elizabeth I: The Shrewdness of Virtue.  New York: Fromm International Publishing Corporation, 1989.  Print.

Robinson, James Harvey. Readings in European History: A Collection of Extracts from the Sources Chosen with the Purpose of Illustrating the Progress of Culture in Western Europe since the German Invasions,. Vol. II. Boston: Ginn &, 1904. Google Books. Web. 19 Jan. 2013.

Ross, Josephine.  The Tudors, England’s Golden Age.  London: Artus, 1994.  Print. 

Somerset, Anne. Elizabeth I.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. Print.

Starkey, David, ed. Rivals in Power. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990. Print.

Strachey, Lytton.  Elizabeth and Essex: A Tragic History.  New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1969. Print.

Tremlett, Giles.  Catherine of Aragon: Henry’s Spanish Queen.  London: Faber and Faber, 2010. Print.

Weir, Alison.  The Life of Elizabeth I.  New York: Ballatine Books, 1998. Print.

Vergil, Polydore. Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia (1555 Version). Ed. Dana F. Sutton.

Irvine: University of California, 2005. Polydore Vergil, Anglica Historia (1555             Version). The Philological Museum, 04 Aug. 2005. Web. 02 Jan. 2013.